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Loan Sharks, Interest-Rate Caps,
and Deregulation
Robert Mayer*
Abstract
The specter of the loan shark is often conjured by advocates of
price deregulation in the market for payday loans. If binding price
caps are imposed, the argument goes, loan sharks will be
spawned. This is the loan-shark thesis. This Article tests that
thesis against the historical record of payday lending in the
United States since the origins of the quick-cash business around
the Civil War. Two different types of creditors have been derided
as “loan sharks” since the epithet was first coined. One used
threats of violence to collect its debts but the other did not. The
former has been less common than the latter. In the United States,
the violent loan sharks proliferated in the small-loan market after
state usury caps were raised considerably and these loan sharks
dwindled away as a source of credit for working people before
interest-rate deregulation began to be adopted at the end of the
1970s. The other type of loan shark thrived both when usury
ceilings were very low and when they were very high or even
removed. Deregulation does not starve the nonviolent species of
loan shark into extinction but instead feeds it. Hence the loanshark thesis is seriously flawed. It does not accord well with the
historical record of the market for payday loans.
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I. Introduction
Defenders of expensive, subprime credit products like payday
loans often claim that imposing interest-rate caps on consumer
credit will bring back the loan sharks that were said to have been
starved into extinction by the policy of financial deregulation.
This is the loan-shark thesis. The thesis is often asserted in
passing by advocates of interest-rate deregulation,1 but it has
recently been defended in detail in an article published in
Banking Law Journal entitled “History Repeats Itself: Why
Interest Rate Caps Pave the Way for the Return of the Loan
1. See Todd Zywicki, Consumer Use and Government Regulation of Title
Pledge Lending, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 425, 457 (2010) (“The flexibility and
deregulation of consumer credit markets in the United States has substantially
reduced the importance of illegal loan-shark lending.” (citation omitted)).
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Sharks.”2 According to its authors, Justice David Baker and
MacKenzie Breitenstein, “it is possible if interest-rate caps are
again used as a primary means of regulating consumer credit
that the loan-shark industry will return to prominence as
regulated lenders will quit lending to high risk borrowers.”3 This
is said to be the perverse consequence of trying to regulate the
price of consumer credit. Outlawing high prices spawns loan
sharks, who are the worst sort of creditors. They beat or kill
debtors who are late with their payments. Rate caps, we are told,
unintentionally drive credit-constrained consumers into their
clutches because price ceilings ration legal credit away from the
least-advantaged and riskiest applicants. According to Baker and
Breitenstein, the history of credit regulation in the United States
teaches us this lesson.4
But in this Article I will show that, depending on how we
define “loan shark,” this intuitively plausible thesis is either false
and indeed exactly wrong, or too simple and thus misleading.
Historically, there have been two distinct types of creditors that
were derided as loan sharks, one using threats of violence to
collect its debts but the other not. The former has been less
common than the latter. In the United States, the violent loan
sharks proliferated in the small-loan market after state usury
caps were raised considerably and these loan sharks dwindled
away as a source of credit for working people before interest-rate
deregulation began to be adopted at the end of the 1970s. The
other type of loan shark thrived both when usury ceilings were
very low and when they were very high or even removed.
Deregulation, we must realize, does not starve the nonviolent
species of loan shark into extinction but instead feeds it. That is
the perverse consequence of removing the cap on interest rates in
the market for small loans.
Once we adopt a more nuanced view of what a loan shark is,
it becomes clear that no policy can eliminate this type of creditor
once and for all. There will always be loan sharks of one sort or
2. See generally Justice David Baker & MacKenzie Breitenstein, History
Repeats Itself: Why Interest Rate Caps Pave the Way for the Return of the Loan
Sharks, 127 BANKING L.J. 581 (2010).
3. Id. at 594.
4. See id. at 598 (referring to “the disastrous, unintended consequences
created by interest rate regulations”).
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another. The aim of public policy ought to be to minimize both
varieties and not just the violent species. The regulatory strategy
that best achieves this goal is the moderate price cap, neither too
low nor too high (let alone rescinded). What history teaches us is
that an interest rate capped between the extremes in the smallloan market has reduced the total loan-shark population more
effectively than the policy of interest-rate deregulation favored by
those who subscribe to the loan-shark thesis. While it is true that
excessively low interest-rate caps do have perverse consequences
for the population this policy is meant to protect, we have to
recognize that interest-rate deregulation also has perverse
consequences because it spawns at least as many loan sharks as
financial repression. The history of payday lending since its
origins at the end of the nineteenth century illustrates this
double-sided perversity of interest-rate regulation.5
II. What Is a Loan Shark?
As Ronald Goldstock and Dan Coenen observe, “The term
‘loanshark’ lacks a precise definition; neither linguists nor
lawyers have concentrated on the term.”6 They also correctly note
that “differing generations have assigned the term differing
connotations.”7
The epithet loan shark is an Americanism and emerged in
popular discourse late in the nineteenth century.8 It is one of a
family of slang metaphors that likens some object of opprobrium
to the predatory behavior of the shark (“card shark,” “land
shark,” “money shark,” “legal shark”). Though any sharp lender
may be described disparagingly as a loan shark, from the
beginning this particular phrase was associated with a set of
expensive small-loan products that had come into existence
around the Civil War, in particular the chattel mortgage and the
salary loan. The chattel-mortgage lender advanced cash on the
5. See generally ROBERT MAYER, QUICK CASH: THE STORY OF THE LOAN
SHARK (2010) (recounting the history of loan-sharking).
6. RONALD GOLDSTOCK & DAN COENEN, EXTORTIONATE AND USURIOUS
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS: BACKGROUND MATERIALS 1 (1978) (citation omitted).
7. Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
8. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 3–4, 13–14.

LOAN SHARKS

811

security of a debtor’s furniture or household possessions, while
the salary lender or salary broker took a wage assignment to
ensure repayment.9 The latter product was the original payday
loan, tied as it was to the debtor’s payment cycle, but in the
popular press of the day these vendors of what was typically an
unamortized cash advance were regularly labeled as loan sharks.
The anathema was applied not narrowly, to the exceptionally
unscrupulous lender, but broadly, to the industry as a whole.
Lending in this fashion, at high rates and on the security of a
wage assignment, was widely viewed as predatory behavior.
A. Original Intent
What was thought to be predatory or shark-like about the
salary loan, however, was not the use or threat of violence to
collect the debt. Salary lenders did not beat or kill borrowers who
defaulted on their loans.10 These creditors also did not have ties
to organized crime families, which scarcely existed at this time.11
The collection methods of the first loan sharks were certainly
aggressive, but in contemporary accounts one almost never reads
about acts of brute force. To compel repayment, salary lenders
pestered debtors incessantly at home, or sent “bawlers-out” to
make a scene at work, or processed wage assignments, or used
the powers of attorney they had taken to confess judgment before
justices of the peace.12 They did not have to lay a hand on
customers in arrears to do a profitable business. Indeed, many
firms had a preference for hiring women as loan agents because,
as one news story explained, “they give an appearance of
harmlessness to the lending establishment, and an outraged
borrower is not so anxious to kick the manager out of a window if

9. See LOUIS ROBINSON & ROLF NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN
BUSINESS 35–36 (1935).
10. See Mark Haller & John Alviti, Loan-sharking in American Cities:
Historical Analysis of a Marginal Enterprise, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 125, 125
(1977) (“There is no evidence that these loansharks used violence for collection
of debts.”).
11. See id. (“Such loansharks, so far as can be determined, had no
connection with gambling syndicates or other ‘organized crime’ activities.”).
12. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 38–41.
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she is a woman.”13 The salary-lending businesses were not
thuggish, even though the vast majority operated in defiance of
the applicable usury statute.
The “bite” in the salary-loan transaction that provoked the
loan shark epithet came not at the end, when the debt was
collected, but at the beginning and referred to the peculiar
structure of this credit product, which took the form of a trap.
According to Neifeld’s Manual on Consumer Credit, published in
1961, “[t]he essence of loan shark deals is small amounts for short
terms, with an effort to keep the principal out all the time to
secure repeated renewals of the interest charge.”14 It was lending
in this fashion, to prolong the interest payments and to ensnare
borrowers in debt, that qualified a creditor as a loan shark in the
original sense of the phrase: “Loan shark evils appear where the
method of lending requires the entire indebtedness of the wage
earner to mature at one time. Inability to pay anything but the
interest on the loan almost inevitably results from this method of
lending money.”15
Neifeld’s Manual on Consumer Credit appeared at the
beginning of a decade in which the idea of what a loan shark is
was about to change and acquire its more modern connotation,
but the manual merely summed up the widely held view that had
crystallized over the previous half-century. “The real aim of loan
sharks,” explained Avon Books’ How and Where to Borrow Money,
“is to keep their customers eternally in debt so that interest (for
the sharks) becomes almost an annuity.”16 A scholarly study on
The Small-Loan Industry in Texas, published in 1960, noted that,
while the loan shark always charges a high rate of interest, “he
does more than this. He loans for . . . too short a period of
time . . . making the payments too high, and . . . encouraging
renewals or refinancing.”17 “This insistence upon planned, orderly
liquidation of the loan is one of the hallmarks of the honest
lender,” reported an earlier scholarly article.18 “The unlicensed
13. See Staff, Loan Shark Hires Women to Weave Web About Him, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 7, 1912, at 1, 7.
14. M.R. NEIFELD, NEIFELD’S MANUAL ON CONSUMER CREDIT 389 (1961).
15. Id. at 387–88.
16. IRA COBLEIGH, HOW AND WHERE TO BORROW MONEY 109 (1964).
17. DONALD TYREE, THE SMALL-LOAN INDUSTRY IN TEXAS 59 (1960).
18. Charles Gates, The Social Worker in the Service of the Small Loan
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loan shark, on the other hand, seldom wants his principal so long
as he gets his interest.”19 Even as late as 1982, after the
associations of the loan shark had already begun to change,
Playboy Paperbacks’ The Complete Guide to Credit and Loans
could still say “the major feature [in this type of credit
transaction] is that the loan shark is more concerned in collecting
the interest than the principal.”20 Violent debt collection was not
identified as a necessary element, let alone the defining trait, of
the loan-shark deal.
B. A Second Sense
But the word association of the loan shark epithet changed
quickly during the 1960s. Exposés of mob lending operations
captured the headlines in cities like Chicago and New York and
helped to redefine this opprobrium.21 The emphasis shifted to the
method of debt collection, which was depicted as extortionate. A
loan shark came to be understood as a black-market creditor with
ties to organized crime who employed violence, or threats of
violence, to compel repayment of a debt. In 1968, Congress
enacted the Consumer Credit Protection Act,22 the second title of
which proscribed “Extortionate Credit Transactions.”23 Though
the phrase loan shark did not figure in the legislation itself,
popular and legal commentary equated the extortionate credit
transaction with loan-sharking, thereby shifting the emphasis in
the concept to the back end of the exchange.24 How repayment of
a debt is compelled became the defining trait of the loan-shark
transaction. The idea now implied violence. This new
understanding increasingly supplanted the original conception,
Business, 196 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE 221, 223 (1938).
19. Id.
20. GERALD GIBBS, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO CREDIT AND LOANS 65 (1982).
21. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 105 (discussing several newspaper articles
related to mob lending).
22. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146
(1968).
23. Id. §§ 891–896.
24. See, e.g., N.Y. COMM’N OF INVESTIGATION, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
LOAN-SHARK RACKET (1965).
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which emphasized the cost of the debt and the trap-like nature of
the repayment plan. If “loan-sharking” is made synonymous with
the extortionate credit transaction, then ironically the turn-ofthe-century salary lenders, for whom the epithet had been
invented, could no longer be classified as loan sharks.
Court opinions over the course of the twentieth century
nicely registered this transformation in the image of the loan
shark. In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Wheeler,25 one of the
first opinions to employ this colloquialism, the Illinois Supreme
Court explained that “the ‘loan shark’ business, so-called, . . . is
said to consist in the loaning of small amounts of money to clerks
and other salaried employés, and to other persons, on chattel
mortgages covering household goods, etc., at usurious rates of
interest, from 10 per cent. upwards a month.”26 Here the
clientele, the nature of the loan product, and the cost are
emphasized; there is no mention of violence. Fast-forward forty
years and the same idea is still being expressed by the Supreme
Court of Kansas in State ex rel. Fatzer v. Molitor27:
defendants engaged in what was commonly known as the “loan
shark business,” the principal object of which was to collect
and exact usurious rates of interest from laboring people, wage
earners and others of small means who are forced by
necessitous circumstances, such as sickness and other
emergencies which placed them in critical situations,
necessitating their obtaining funds to borrow small sums of
money.28

Another ten years elapses before the first association of the
phrase with violence is recorded, in Macari v. N.Y. Mid-Hudson
Trans-Corp.,29 issued by the Supreme Court of New York: “[T]he
deceased was deeply indebted to ‘loan sharks’ and was fearful of
his safety.”30

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
1963).
30.

People ex rel. Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Wheeler, 102 N.E. 188 (Ill. 1913).
Id. at 188.
State ex rel. Fatzer v. Molitor, 263 P.2d 207 (Kan. 1953).
Id. at 208.
Macari v. N.Y. Mid-Hudson Trans-Corp., 19 A.D.2d 671 (N.Y. App. Div.
Id. at 671.
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C. The Common Denominator

What this quick history of an Americanism demonstrates is
that the loan shark has been not one breed but two. One variety
uses violence to collect its debts but the other does not. The bite of
this other loan shark, which appeared first on the scene, consists
in the steep price it charges for its cash advances and in the debt
trap that its product becomes for many consumers because the
cost is high and the repayment period short. This original loan
shark was fundamentally a debt trapper; the creditor vended an
ostensibly short-term product that was “so designed as to
handicap repayment.”31 We identify this loan shark by the
volume of expensive renewals it authorizes and by the duration of
its nominally short-term debts.
In fact, the other type of loan shark, the one that uses force
against debtors in default, has tended to engage in the same sort
of behavior as the first. It is a debt trapper too. Many mob loans
have been unamortized and interest-only (or “vigorish”), thus
requiring a lump-sum payment at the end to retire the debt.32
This lender, like the other, wants the borrower to extend the debt
continuously because the steep interest payments are lucrative
and because it can be both costly and risky to switch clients
frequently.33 As one mob-connected loan shark catering to factory
workers in the 1960s explained, “I don’t care when you pay back
the principal . . . . Just keep up the interest payments every
payday, that’s all.”34 This is the business model of every bona fide
loan shark, violent or not.
Certain kinds of lenders, catering to certain kinds of
customers and operating in certain kinds of conditions, have had
to employ violence to make the business model of debt trapping
31. FINDLEY WEAVER, OKLAHOMA’S SMALL LOAN PROBLEM 21 (1938).
32. See PETER REUTER & JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN NEW
YORK: A CASE STUDY IN THE OPERATION, STRUCTURE, AND REGULATION OF AN
ILLEGAL MARKET 173–74 (1982) (distinguishing between “knockdown,” or
installment loans, and lump-sum “vig” loans).
33. See Loan-Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, 5
COL . J.L. & SOC. PROBS . 91, 95–96 (1969) (“A loan shark never wants his
loan paid back.” (quoting interview with Gerard T. McGuire, Special U.S.
Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Strike Force, in N.Y.C. (Oct. 31, 1968))).
34. The Confessions of a 6-For-5 “Juice Man,” 49 BURROUGHS CLEARING
HOUSE 40, 40 (1965).
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financially profitable. But other kinds of lenders, like the salary
brokers a hundred years ago, did not. Their debt trapping was
nonviolent. A regulatory policy that intends to attack loansharking ought to address both forms of the phenomenon and not
only the violent breed. The violent loan sharks have always been
less common than the nonviolent ones and the predations of the
latter are thus typically more widespread. The two stand in a
complicated relationship to one another, as we shall see.
Strategies that reduce one population may increase the other.
Hence fighting each breed in isolation can be counterproductive.
The history of interest-rate caps confirms this observation. When
they are too low or too high, debt trapping in one form or the
other has proliferated.
III. Low Caps and No Caps
The development of consumptive lending in Great Britain
and the United States late in the nineteenth century illustrates
what happens when interest-rate regulation veers toward one
extreme or the other. In both countries, loan-sharking of the
nonviolent sort spread widely in urban areas. In the United
States, interest-rate caps were very low; in Great Britain, there
was no cap at all.
A. American Loan Sharks
Until the late 1970s, regulation of the interest rates lenders
could charge was entirely decentralized in the United States.
Each state government established its own policy.35 During the
nineteenth century, a few states deregulated interest rates, at
least briefly, but the great majority imposed an annual
percentage rate cap between 6% and 12%.36 As a rule, newer
states permitted higher charges to attract lending capital for
35. See J.B.C. MURRAY, THE HISTORY OF USURY 70–91 (1866) (recounting
the history of interest-rate regulation in each of the states through the Civil
War).
36. See George Holmes, Usury in Law, in Practice and in Psychology, 7
POL. SCI. Q. 431, 431–33 (1892) (discussing the rate caps imposed by the states).
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development.37 The ceiling applied to every loan transaction
within the jurisdiction, except where pawnbroking was licensed.38
Usury before the twentieth century was rarely classified as a
criminal offense. When proven, lenders forfeited the remaining
interest specified by the contract, and sometimes the principal as
well, but they were not sent to jail.39
Despite the existence of such low caps since colonial days,
loan-sharking did not emerge in the United States until
sometime around the Civil War.40 Its precondition has always
been a large mass of urban workers, white- and blue-collar,
earning modest but steady pay.
Loan-sharking isn’t feasible in a population that ekes out a
bare subsistence. It also isn’t feasible if the debtors lack a
steady income stream. Only people with recurring paydays can
get payday loans. The phenomenon of payday is a product of
the industrial revolution and its routinization of wage-labor.
Factory-hands and office workers became employees—people
whose services were engaged on a more or less continuous
basis and who were paid not at the end of the harvest but
every week or month.41

As David Caplovitz observes, “the bureaucratization of the world
of work is a structural prerequisite for the credit society.”42 Loan
sharks were present at the birth of our credit society and they
were spawned in the income stream of a swelling mass of wageworkers who lived from payday to payday.
Chattel-mortgage and salary-loan sharks proliferated at the
end of the nineteenth century because the small, short-term loans
37. See Edward Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower nor a
Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41
J.L. & ECON. 1, 13 (1998) (“In general, usury-rate ceilings rise with distance
from the Atlantic Ocean.”).
38. See JOHN CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS,
PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 20 (1994) (describing the higher interest rates
pawnbrokers were allowed to charge).
39. See Holmes, supra note 36, at 433–35 (classifying the penalties for
usury in each state).
40. See ROBINSON & NUGENT, supra note 9, at 35–45 (recounting the history
of small-loan products in the United States).
41. MAYER, supra note 5, at 15.
42. David Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, in CONSUMER
CREDIT REFORM 3, 5 (Clark Havighurst ed., 1970).
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working people needed to get them to the next payday could not
be made profitably when the interest rate on credit was capped at
such a low level. A typical salary loan of $20 due in one month at
a rate of 7% a year would only earn the lender about a dime—
hardly enough to cover the expenses of an office, processing the
loan application, debt collection, and default.43 Any lender who
tried to make a business of catering to the swelling demand for
payday loans at that time would have had to charge substantially
more than the law permitted. By the start of the twentieth
century, the going rate for unamortized salary loans was 20% a
month or 240% a year.44 That’s cheaper than the typical payday
loan today but it was twenty times the rate permitted a hundred
years ago in states with the highest caps. Despite the expense,
demand for these tiny bridge loans was great. At the height of the
market, in the second decade of the twentieth century, reformers
estimated that something like one-quarter of all urban wage
earners borrowed from loan sharks in any given year.45
The cost of the salary-loan product was inflated by the
grayness of the market, which increased the lenders’ risk, by
collusion among the lenders, and by the ignorance of borrowers
and their failure to shop widely for credit. Competition in this
market was very imperfect.46 But high cost by itself is not the
hallmark of loan-sharking. Short-term loans will always be
relatively expensive. The distinctive feature of loan-sharking, as
noted in the previous Part, is the debt trap into which many
borrowers are enticed by the either/or structure of these
unamortized cash advances: either pay off the debt in one lump
sum this payday or extend the due date another cycle for an
additional, expensive fee. If you borrowed $20 last payday, you
could pay $24 today and clear the debt or roll over the principal
another cycle for an additional $4 charge. Inevitably, given the
43. See CLARENCE WASSAM, THE SALARY LOAN BUSINESS IN NEW YORK CITY
24 (1908) (describing average transactions).
44. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 36 (reporting standard interest rates for a
salary loan).
45. See CLARENCE HODSON, MONEY-LENDERS, LICENSE LAWS AND THE
BUSINESS OF MAKING SMALL LOANS 13 (1919).
46. See Clyde Phelps, Monopolistic and Imperfect Competition in Consumer
Loans, 8 J. MARKETING 382, 382 (1944) (distinguishing between the market for
commercial loans and consumer personal installment loans).
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cash-strapped clientele to which the salary lenders catered, many
debtors opted for the smaller payment. A new financial
emergency might compel them to borrow from a different salary
lender, using the proceeds of this new transaction to pay the fee
for the old one. Late charges were added to the principal, which
meant the fee would rise too. Frantic borrowers built pyramids of
debt from a single, small cash advance. One survey from the
period reported that 40% of these ostensibly short-term loans
were extended for at least twenty-four months.47 The newspapers
of the day were filled with stories of debtors bled dry for years
and driven to desperate straits by the predations of the salary
lenders.48 That’s why they were derided as loan sharks.
B. British Moneylenders
Low usury ceilings a hundred years ago helped spawn the
first loan sharks. The low rates lenders were required to charge
prevented the development of more responsible products in the
legal market. But deregulation of interest rates in the market for
consumer loans did not automatically put an end to loansharking. Great Britain repealed its usury statute in 1854,
initiating a bold experiment in deregulation.49 But the new class
of moneylenders that multiplied during the next fifty years
engaged in the same sorts of practices that were beginning to
make the American salary lenders notorious near the turn of the
century.
Baker and Breitenstein recount the indictment of the British
moneylending industry that was drawn up by reformers and a
parliamentary commission in the last years of the nineteenth
century,50 but they fail to note that these abuses abounded in a
deregulated market for consumer credit. Rates were condemned
as excessive, the lenders engaged in deceptive practices, harsh

47.
48.
49.

See WASSAM, supra note 43, at 81.
See MAYER, supra note 5, at 37.
See DOROTHY ORCHARD & GEOFFREY MAY, MONEYLENDING
BRITAIN 43 (1933).
50. See Baker & Breitenstein, supra note 2, at 584–85.

IN
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collection methods were still employed, and many who borrowed
became trapped by their debts.51 The commission found
that in many cases default is inevitable, and that once a
borrower has obtained a loan from a money-lender it is
extremely difficult for him to get clear of the transaction. The
circumstances are generally such as to force him to obtain
renewal after renewal at increasingly extortionate rates until
he is utterly ruined.52

This is precisely what the Americans were beginning to call loansharking in the 1890s, but it flourished in an essentially free
market. The report concluded that “the system of money lending
by professional money-lenders at high rates of interest is
productive of crime, bankruptcy, unfair advantage over other
creditors of the borrower, extortion from the borrower’s family
and friends, and other serious injuries to the community.”53
Indeed, the commissioners went so far as to claim “that only in
rare cases is a person benefited by a loan obtained from a
professional money-lender, and that the evil attendant upon the
system far outweighs the good.”54
In comparison to the American salary loan, the British
promissory note seemed like a bargain. The typical rate was 5% a
month, but the sums advanced were often larger and thus not
exactly comparable to the American payday loan product of that
period.55 Interest-rate deregulation may therefore have made
small cash loans in Great Britain less expensive than in the
United States, but deregulation did not do away with the debt
trap that was the main loan-shark evil plaguing consumers.
Rather than re-impose price controls, Parliament opted instead
for information disclosure and judicial review of contracts in the
Moneylenders Act of 1900. Creditors were required to register
51. See ORCHARD & MAY, supra note 49, at 43–76 (describing the abuses
that flourished during the era of deregulation); see also THOMAS FARROW, IN THE
MONEY-LENDER’S CLUTCHES (1895).
52. SELECT COMMITTEE ON MONEY-LENDING, REPORT , 1898, H.C., at iv
(U.K).
53. Id. at v.
54. Id.
55. See ORCHARD & MAY, supra note 49, at 67 (“The usual rate on
promissory notes, not too well secured, was 60 or 70 per cent a year . . . .
Charges as high as 3,600 per cent were not unknown.”).
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with the government and to desist from false advertising, while
courts of equity were authorized to give relief when they deemed
a transaction to be “harsh and unconscionable.”56 “But,” as
Dorothy Orchard and Geoffrey May observed in their classic
study, Moneylending in Great Britain, “business practice is like a
gyroscope; to change its direction a considerable force must be
applied. The act of 1900 did not apply sufficient force to redirect
the course of moneylending; its results were modifications of
details and extremes only.”57 Shark-like practices persisted in the
market for cash loans and had to be attacked a quarter century
later by a new Moneylenders Act, which established the
presumption that interest in excess of 48% a year was
unconscionable.58
Price deregulation in Great Britain did not prevent the
emergence of loan-sharking in its nonviolent form at the end of
the nineteenth century. That form of predatory lending thrived
where the rate was low and where the rate ceiling had been
removed. In both environments lenders prospered by trapping
many of their customers. A better, more responsible loan product
was not generated spontaneously in either market. It took
philanthropic initiative and government action to fashion such a
product in the United States after the turn of the twentieth
century. The low ceilings in many American states were raised,
but only to the point where experience demonstrated that this
new and more consumer-friendly type of loan product could be
vended profitably by authorized creditors. The result was a
drastic reduction in the cost of credit for consumers and,
simultaneously, a dwindling of the old loan-shark population.
IV. Finding the Mean
The invention of the Uniform Small Loan Law (USLL) was
one of the great achievements of progressivism in the first

56.
1900).
57.
58.
1927).

See id. at 76–80 (reproducing the text of the Money-Lenders Act of
Id. at 81.
See id. at 115–35 (reproducing the text of the Moneylenders Act of
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decades of the twentieth century.59 This model law was drafted by
representatives of the Russell Sage Foundation in cooperation
with a fraction of chattel-mortgage lenders who were seeking to
rehabilitate their industry by carving out a legal exception to the
low usury caps for a new, responsible lending product.60
Variations of the USLL were adopted by three-quarters of the
state legislatures by the middle of the century.61 Baker and
Breitenstein acknowledge that the USLL was “effective in
eliminating the moneylenders” who had operated in defiance of
the old usury statutes, yet they depict the model law as a
misguided failure because violent loan sharks emerged in some
jurisdictions after its provisions were put into effect.62 But this
assessment is too harsh. The USLL was in fact the most
successful regulatory strategy ever devised to minimize the two
kinds of loan-sharking that have been the plague of payday since
the birth of the credit society. In many states where this law was
enacted the loan-shark debt trap that had once been so common
all but disappeared by the middle of the twentieth century.
A. The Anti-Loan Shark Act
The story of the origin of the USLL has been told before,63 so
my discussion will be brief. This piece of legislation was the
product of trial and error by progressive reformers who had come
to the realization that low usury caps were counterproductive. As
the author of the USLL, Arthur Ham, explained, “drastic laws
result, not in the discontinuance of the usurious loan business,
but in driving it further into the dark. Any attempt to work
unnecessary hardship on the lender, to compass him about with
59. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 46–47 (explaining why the USLL was “a
textbook example of progressive public policy”).
60. See ROBINSON & NUGENT, supra note 9, at 113–17 (recounting how the
USLL was drafted).
61. See F. B. Hubachek, Progress and Problems in Regulation of Consumer
Credit, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4, 8 (1954) (noting that there were “36 states
now having effective or partially effective small loan laws”).
62. See Baker & Breitenstein, supra note 2, at 586.
63. See generally Elizabeth Anderson, Experts, Ideas, and Policy Change:
the Russell Sage Foundation and Small Loan Reform, 1909–1941, in 37 THEORY
& SOC’Y 271 (2008) (describing the history, origin, and effect of the USLL).
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unreasonable restriction, has the inevitable result of forcing the
borrower to pay a still higher charge for his loan.”64 Experience
had demonstrated that a purely repressive strategy missed its
mark. Consumers would continue to patronize the loan sharks
until they were provided with a better alternative. Ham was able
to convince a broad coalition of progressive forces that “the
remedy appears to lie in attracting honest capital into the salary
loan business on a reasonable money-making basis.”65 This was
accomplished by devising a credit product that was more
expensive than a bank loan but still reasonably priced and, most
importantly, structured in such a way that debtors could retire
the principal in installments spread over a number of paydays.66
The first draft of the USLL, authored in 1916, carved out an
exception to the existing state usury ceiling for cash loans of $300
or less when vended by licensed dealers, subject to regulatory
oversight, who were required to compute interest on the unpaid
balance of the loan only and were not permitted to take interest
in advance.67 The maximum permissible charge was 3.5% a
month, or 42% a year, but because the debt was amortized, the
effective cost was considerably less.68 A borrower who received
$100 in cash and was given a year to retire the debt paid less
than $24 in interest.69 In the early years of the new “personal
finance industry” called into existence by the USLL, the debt was
typically secured with a chattel mortgage on home furnishings,

64. ARTHUR HAM, REMEDIAL LOANS: A CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM 4–5 (1912).
65. Id. at 11.
66. See M. R. Neifeld, Institutional Organization of Consumer Credit, 8
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 27 (1941) (explaining that because “[i]n the
American statute, the rate is a monthly one and must be so expressed,” lenders
must schedule repayment in monthly installments).
67. See DAVID GALLERT, WALTER HILBORN & GEOFFREY MAY, SMALL LOAN
LEGISLATION 90–94 (1932) (reproducing the text of the first draft of the USLL).
68. See id. at 92 (explaining that principal on loans must not exceed $300,
interest rates must not exceed 3½% per month and may not be compounded, nor
may interest be applied to any portion of the loan that had already been paid).
69. See EVANS CLARK, FINANCING THE CONSUMER 117 (1930) (“Borrowers
who are charged 3½% per month on a $100 installment repayment loan do not
pay $42 on the $100, as they would if their notes were discounted at that rate in
advance. They pay a total of $22.75 because they are charged each month only
for the balance of the loan of which they still have the actual use.”).

824

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807 (2012)

but over time most lenders dispensed with this formality and
converted these extensions of credit into signature loans.70
In states like Illinois, where the existing usury cap was 7%,71
the USLL raised the legal price creditors could charge for smallcash loans by a factor of six. But, since the typical salary loan cost
20% a month in interest, the USLL managed to cut the stated
price of small loans by a factor of six.72 The effective savings were
even greater, since the regulated loans had to be amortized and
the penalty fees lenders could assess were limited. Cash loans
cost one-tenth of what had been the going rate when the usury
cap was low.73 Raising the permissible charge saved consumers
enormously. Lower prices also reduced the likelihood that
borrowers would become trapped by their debts. Regulators and
lenders also took steps to ensure that households could not
pyramid debts by borrowing from more than one authorized
dealer at a time.74
Over the next three decades the USLL went through seven
drafts.75 Later versions closed loopholes through which new types
of loan sharks, like the salary buyers, managed to slip for a
time.76 Baker and Breitenstein claim that “interest rate caps were
largely abandoned as a means of regulating consumer credit
beginning in the 1930s . . . because of the pervasive loan shark
problem in the United States,”77 but the opposite is true. In fact, a
number of states in the 1930s experimented with reducing the
70. See Adele Rabino, The Small Loan Law and Its Application in Illinois
64 (1942) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, Northwestern University) (noting the
transformation from chattel-mortgage to signature loans in the personal finance
industry) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
71. See FRANKLIN W. RYAN, USURY AND USURY LAWS 29 (1924) (charting the
legal rates and lawful limits of interest in 1921).
72. See Mayer, supra note 5, at 114.
73. See id.
74. See WILLFORD KING, THE SMALL LOAN SITUATION IN NEW JERSEY 22
(1929) (“[T]he loan companies make every effort to prevent one man from
borrowing from several different companies at once.”).
75. See Hubachek, supra note 61, at 7 (“Seven drafts of the Foundation’s
uniform bill were published, the last in 1942. The basic principles of the first
draft were continued in all later drafts. Changes merely improved the law to
meet changing conditions.”).
76. See ROBINSON & NUGENT, supra note 9, at 157–61.
77. Baker & Breitenstein, supra note 2, at 582.
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statutory rate to save consumers even more money.78 No state
deregulated consumer credit during this era of bank failures.
Modest reductions in the price of credit proved feasible; 36% a
year became the maximum charge in many places at this time.79
But where the ceiling was lowered too much, loan-sharking in its
antediluvian form resurfaced.80 It also continued unabated in the
eighteen states that had not enacted some version of the USLL
before World War Two. The Russell Sage Foundation estimated
that there was about $100 million in unregulated lending
occurring in the United States in 1937.81 More than three-fourths
of it was concentrated in the states with low usury caps, even
though these jurisdictions accounted for less than 30% of the total
population.82
B. The Extinction of a Predator
By the middle of the twentieth century, when the personal
finance industry had fully matured and salary buying had been
completely stamped out in the regulated states, many experts
attested that loan-sharking had been all but extirpated where the
USLL was in effect.83 A 1954 symposium in Law and
Contemporary Problems extolled the success of the model law:
“This law has virtually eliminated the loan shark wherever it has
been enacted in full. It has done so by permitting a regulated,
commercial, competitive source of consumer loans to operate at
much lower than the loan shark’s rates though substantially
78. See Rolf Nugent, Three Experiments in Small-Loan Interest Rates, 11
HARV. BUS. REV. 35, 37–46 (1933) (discussing the impact of three states’
decisions to lower maximum small-loan interest rates, beginning in 1929 and
continuing into the 1930s).
79. See ROBINSON & NUGENT, supra note 9, at 259–60.
80. See Nugent, supra note 78, at 42–46 (noting the growth of illegal
lending in New Jersey and West Virginia after the rate cap for small loans was
reduced).
81. See ROLF NUGENT, CONSUMER CREDIT AND ECONOMIC STABILITY 401
(1939).
82. See id. at 390–402 (reporting estimates of illegal lending across the
United States at the end of the 1930s).
83. See NATIONAL CONSUMER FINANCE ASSOCIATION, THE CONSUMER
FINANCE INDUSTRY 6 (1962) (“The Uniform Small Loan Law eliminated the loan
shark wherever it was enacted.”).
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higher than ordinary usury limits.”84 The Legal Aid Society of
Minneapolis was “pleased to report that no cases of usurious
lending in the small loan field have come to the attention of this
office in the past several years. Prior to the passage of the
Uniform Small Loan Act in 1939 this office was constantly
involved in defending victims of ‘loan shark’ lending at rates far
in excess of the legal limits.”85 Nebraska’s Department of Banking
reported that “The disturbing activity and influence of the loan
shark is today at more than a low ebb in Nebraska. It is virtually
non-existent. . . . This almost complete absence of loan sharks is
the most important reason why the borrowers of Nebraska are
receiving the good small loan service they deserve.”86 Searches of
the local press in these states from that time period confirm that
loan-sharking, once so common, had vanished everywhere except
in the movie theaters, where George Raft’s 1952 mob thriller
“Loan Shark” was a matinee favorite.
It was not price deregulation that brought about the demise
of the salary brokers and the salary buyers, those first payday
lenders. The USLL was a price-control law. It capped the rate
lenders could charge, but at a level that made responsible lending
feasible. Price deregulation a hundred years ago would have been
not only politically impossible, given the ancient prejudice
against usury that was still powerful then, but also
counterproductive as a way to fight debt trapping because the
policy would have amounted to issuing a license to loan shark.
Legalization might have made the salary loan somewhat cheaper,
though price deregulation in today’s payday-loan market has not
had that effect.87 But legalization of high rates would have done
nothing to force the salary lenders to amortize their product and
to prevent overborrowing. We know this is true because price
deregulation in the payday-loan market today has never had

84. Hubachek, supra note 61, at 5.
85. See J.A.A. Burnquist, A Regulatory Small Loan Law Solves Loan Shark
Problem, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 41 (1954) (quoting a letter from the Chief
Counsel of the Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis).
86. Harold Johnson, Nebraska Has No Loan Shark Problem Today, 19 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 42, 53 (1954).
87. States that do not cap prices for payday loans record the highest fees
per $100 borrowed.
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those effects.88 It does not undercut loan-sharking but authorizes
it. The experience of the USLL completely contradicts the loanshark thesis: what it teaches us is that unless interest rates in
the small-loan market are capped at a moderate level, debt
trapping will flourish.
V. The Rise and Fall of Mob Payday Lending
While conceding that the USLL eliminated the nonviolent
loan sharks that had savaged America’s cities in the first half of
the twentieth century, Baker and Breitenstein argue that this
piece of legislation had perverse consequences because it
“actually helped to create the American loan shark.”89 They apply
this label to the type of illegal lender “who is usually tied to
organized crime and who, in addition to using deceptive practices
and charging high interest rates, uses violence or threats of
violence as a means of collection.”90 Baker and Breitenstein claim
that this violent type of loan shark is “uniquely American,”91
hence the label, but this is certainly false. Violent, mob-connected
lenders have also operated in recent decades in Great Britain,92
Italy,93 and Japan.94 This breed of loan shark is not uniquely
American, though it does not seem to be present in every
88. Some payday lenders have switched to expensive installment loans
where prices have been capped, but in states without price caps the main
product is the short-term single-payment loan. See Nathalie Martin, 1,000%
Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and
Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 568 (2009) (documenting “a general shift in the
New Mexico small-loan marketplace from payday loans to a new product called
the ‘installment loan’” after more stringent regulations were imposed).
89. Baker & Breitenstein, supra note 2, at 586.
90. Id. at 582.
91. Id. at 583.
92. See Alistair Macdonald & Jeanne Whalen, Loan Sharks Circle CreditStarved Consumers—Illicit Operators Feed on Desperate Borrowers Who Gorged
During Debt Boom; a 2,437% Interest Rate in Britain, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2009,
at A13 (noting an increase in illegal loan sharks in Great Britain).
93. See Mary Jordan, As Italian Banks Tighten Lending, Desperate Firms
Call on the Mafia, WASH. POST., Mar. 1, 2009, at A01 (detailing an increase in
illegal Mafia lending amid the global financial crisis).
94. See DAVID KAPLAN & ALEC DUBRO, YAKUZA: JAPAN’S CRIMINAL
UNDERWORLD 155–57 (2003) (describing an underground consumer credit
market in Japan with “heavy gangster overtones”).
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developed society. Some countries that impose interest-rate
ceilings have had to contend with these predators but others have
not.95 Removing the ceiling also does not guarantee that violent
loan sharks won’t emerge. Great Britain is a case in point.
Violent, mob-connected creditors only came to prominence there
after interest rates were deregulated once again in 1974. More
will be said about this case in a later Part of the Article.96 But the
point I want to make here is that the relationship between
interest-rate regulation and violent loan-sharking is complicated
and cannot be reduced to a simple, elegant formula like the loanshark thesis. That thesis does not explain well the pattern of
violent payday lending in the United States over the last century.
A. Appearance and Reality
Before examining those patterns, three facts about mob loansharking should be borne in mind. First, it hasn’t been as violent
in practice as the media has made it out to be. Experts agree that
“most loan-shark transactions are amicably conducted with both
parties being satisfied.”97 The client needs cash that the loan
shark agrees to provide without asking a lot of questions. The
price is high but nobody else would lend the debtor money, so the
exchange is mutually advantageous. The debtor is motivated to
pay not only because his body is pledged as collateral but also
because he wants to preserve his only line of credit.98 The
creditor, in turn, wants to avoid the expense of hiring a
“nutcracker” to collect the debt. As a 1960s Chicago “juice man”
explained, the cost of hiring a thug to break a deadbeat’s leg
95. See NEW ECONOMICS FOUNDATION, DOORSTEP ROBBERY: WHY THE UK
NEEDS A FAIR LENDING LAW 21 (2009) (“The Institut für Finanzdienstleistungen
(IFF, Institute for financial services) recently, in a submission to the Office of
Fair Trading, highlighted the lack of evidence on loan sharks in Germany. In
addition, extensive internet and literature research did not reveal evidence of
illegal lending in Germany and France.”).
96. See infra Part VII.B (providing examples from states with deregulated
interest rates).
97. Loan-Sharking, supra note 33, at 97.
98. See REUTER & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 32, at 183 (“Persons who have
needed to borrow from a loanshark are . . . likely to wish to borrow from him
again . . . . [M]aintenance of the relationship which a borrower has established
with a loanshark is an important consideration for the borrower.”).
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might exceed the sum he owed and, with a broken leg, it would be
hard for the debtor to earn money and catch up on his payments.
Imposing a less debilitating penalty usually made more sense:
“[A] finger deliberately slit open with a razor blade never kept
anybody from working, and serves as a constant reminder of next
payday.”99 But the best strategy, this loan shark insisted, was to
select customers carefully and not load them with excessive debt:
“When business is good in a smoothly-run operation, muscle is
seldom needed for collections.”100 One of the few empirical studies
of a mob loan-shark operation confirms this view. Based on FBI
case files, the study reported that interviews with 115 customers
of the loan business turned up only one debtor who had been
threatened. None were beaten.101 Perhaps mob lenders in this
particular city were unusually placid, but it would not be
surprising if the use of force was rare. It would not take many
examples to teach the lesson to debtors, and excessive use of force
would only scare off business. The economics of violence in the
loan-shark market tends to diminish the resort to corporal or
capital punishment.
Second, while expensive, the fees charged by mob lenders
were often no more—and sometimes even less—than the fees
charged by today’s payday lenders in the deregulated states. John
Seidl says the standard rate in the 1960s was 20% a week,102
which is more than payday lenders charge now. But he also gives
examples of small loans to working people with annual interest
rates below 200%, which is cheap for a payday loan.103 The
Chicago “juice man” cited above said he charged 10% a week for a
$100 cash advance, which is a little less than the going rate for
payday loans today in states that do not cap the fees.104 The study
based on FBI case files also reported surprisingly low rates. The
99. The Confessions of a 6-For-5 “Juice Man,” supra note 34, at 41.
100. Id.
101. See ANNELISE ANDERSON, THE BUSINESS OF ORGANIZED CRIME 66 (1979)
(finding that “[t]he use of force by members of the Benguena family to encourage
payment is almost nonexistent”).
102. JOHN MICHAEL SEIDL, “UPON THE HIP”—A STUDY OF THE CRIMINAL LOANSHARK INDUSTRY 40 (1968).
103. See id. at 41, 78, 100–01.
104. See The Confessions of a 6-For-5 “Juice Man,” supra note 34, at 40 (“If
you borrow $100, your interest by next payday would only be $10.”).
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typical charge was 20% spread over 10 or 12 weeks; the annual
percentage rate for this product was about 150%.105 Payday loans
today are never that inexpensive.
Third, and most important, we must bear in mind that most
mob loan-sharking in this country has neither catered to working
people in search of emergency cash nor operated as payday credit
in the way that salary lending did early in the twentieth century.
The target populations of extortionate lenders have typically been
gamblers, small businessmen, and fellow criminals in need of
emergency financing.106 There has been some mob payday
lending, too, but it died out long ago and has not been revived in
states that restrict or prohibit payday lending now.107 Awful
though it may be, we must bear in mind that most criminal loansharking in the United States has operated in a different market
from that of high-priced consumer credit. The one product does
not substitute for the other, at least not in the twenty-first
century. Hence regulatory changes in one market, bridge loans
for working people, do not stimulate or constrict operations in the
other market, which caters to a fundamentally different clientele.
B. Scope and Development
Bearing these facts in mind, let us return to the loan-shark
thesis. It says that interest-rate caps breed violent loan sharks.
The USLL is cited as a case in point. But if, as Baker and
Breitenstein maintain, responsibility for the rise of mob loansharking is to be ascribed to the USLL, two patterns must be
explained: first, why this new sort of loan shark emerged only in
certain jurisdictions where interest rates were capped but not in
others; and second, in the jurisdictions where it did emerge, why
mob loan-sharking appeared only long after the law was changed.
Regarding the first question, the evidence is clear that mob
loan-sharking has occurred only in certain geographical areas
and not wherever interest rates are capped or criminal penalties
imposed for usurious lending. Like the nonviolent type of loan105.
106.
107.

ANDERSON, supra note 101, at 65.
Id. at 66–67.
See infra Part V.B.
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sharking, it is an urban phenomenon, but the scope of mob
lending has always been more restricted. Traces of it are to be
found only in the vicinity of the largest metropolitan areas—big
cities like New York, Boston, Philadelphia, or Chicago. These are
the places where crime families have been organized, but outside
their relatively narrow territories mob loan-sharking seems never
to have gained a foothold in this country. In an important study
of criminal loan-sharking carried out in the late 1960s, Seidl tried
to gauge the extent of its reach by traveling across New England
and making inquiries about illegal lending at police stations,
bars, and factories.108 He found no evidence of underworld credit
networks outside the biggest cities.109 There were bookies in the
smaller towns but no loan sharks, not even where there were
large concentrations of factory workers.110 Mob lending could only
establish itself in the largest markets, where it was possible to
escape detection by the authorities.111 Other studies confirm the
same point, that the imposition of interest-rate caps or the
criminalization of illegal lending does not automatically spawn
violent loan sharks. When Maine tightened restrictions on
lending in 1967, many licensed lenders were forced out of
business, but the author of a study critical of this policy conceded
that “no evidence of loan sharking was found” after the limits
were imposed.112 The mob did not suddenly fill the vacuum left by
the retreat of the small-loan companies in states lacking the
megalopolises that offer protective cover to these criminal
organizations.
Violent loan-sharking, then, is not inevitably called into
existence wherever rate caps are imposed. And where it did come
into existence in states that enacted a version of the USLL, the
lag in time is considerable. There is agreement that mob loan-

108. SEIDL, supra note 102, at 97–100.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See George Benston, An Analysis of Maine’s “36 Month Limitation” on
Finance Company Small Loans, in 2 TECHNICAL STUDIES OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE 1, 59 (1975) (claiming that although no
evidence of loan sharking was found in this study, “the evidence of other states
and times speaks otherwise”).
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sharking emerged first in the boroughs of New York.113 Organized
rings only began to operate in the 1930s, after the repeal of
Prohibition.114 But the New York state legislature had raised the
cap for small loans twenty years earlier.115 This is a lengthy
delay, and it is even greater in the other states where mob
lending took root. Illinois, for example, pushed through its
version of the Anti-Loan Shark Act in 1917, yet there are no
traces of syndicate loan-sharking to be found in Chicago until
after World War Two.116 More than a quarter century separates
the enactment of the Illinois law and the rise of “juice” lending, as
it came to be known in Chicago.117 We cannot say, then, that
criminal prohibition of high-rate lending and the emergence of
mob loan-sharking are like cause and effect. Because there is
considerable variance across time and space in the incidence of
this type of violent payday lending, circumstantial factors not
accounted for by the loan-shark thesis seem crucial.
C. Evolution and Decay
As Seidl notes, “criminal loan-sharking developed first as a
small-loan business.”118 It was a form of payday lending but
distinctive because its debt collectors were willing to lay their
hands on customers who fell behind in their payments. For fifteen
or twenty years this model of payday lending was largely
concentrated within the boundaries of New York.119 It seems to
113. See SEIDL, supra note 102, at 43 (“The earliest criminal loan-sharking
that the author is aware of was conducted in New York City during the
1920’s.”).
114. See Haller & Alviti, supra note 10, at 142 (“Not until the early 1930’s
did racketeer loansharks develop the small loan market to consumers that had
been serviced by the salary lenders.”).
115. See ROGER BARRETT, COMPILATION OF CONSUMER FINANCE LAWS 422
(1952) (discussing the legislative history of New York’s Consumer Finance Act).
116. See ILLINOIS CRIME INVESTIGATING COMMISSION, JUICE RACKETEERS 6
(1970) (“[D]uring the post-World War II period organized crime discovered the
tremendous profits to be made from loan sharking.”).
117. Id.
118. See SEIDL, supra note 102, at 126.
119. See Haller & Alviti, supra note 10, at 126 (“For many cities, . . . such
loan sharking probably did not become a standard underworld activity until the
1950s.”).
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have sprouted in Chicago and other big cities during the 1950s
but only came to the attention of the media in the next decade.
Many sensational stories were written about the violence of “juice
racketeers,” reshaping the popular image of what a loan shark
is.120 But even as the public was becoming aware of this new type
of loan-sharking, and at the same time forgetting that another
type had once existed in the days before the USLL, mob lending
was transforming itself. By the end of the decade informed
observers began to note that, “while the prime victims of the loan
sharks were formerly selected from impoverished wage earners,
the prey is now found in the middle classes.”121 Businessmen and
professionals had become the preferred clientele for syndicate
loan sharks because they had collateral to seize in case of default
and because a few larger loans were easier to service, less risky,
and more lucrative than many tiny payday loans.122 Another
observer at this time claimed that the $6-for-$5 factory
operations of yesteryear were now “an anachronism bearing
virtually no relation to current reality” in the black-market world
of loan-sharking.123 Later still, an FBI official in New York would
insist that “organized crime in this region has grown from the
traditional concept of giving small loans to poor slobs who are
beaten up by the system and need a few hundred bucks to a
corporate level of substantial loans to businessmen.”124 In this
respect, the mob loan sharks were merely imitating the behavior
of the personal finance companies, which were increasingly
abandoning the payday-loan business they had been established
to provide because it was less profitable than selling second
mortgages.125 Both sorts of lenders, legal and illegal, moved up
120. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 104–07 (“The Chicago Papers were filled
with stories in the 1960s of debtors who were harassed and beaten.”).
121. Comment, Syndicate Loan-Shark Activities and New York’s Usury
Statute, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 167 (1966).
122. See REUTER & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 32, at 172, 175 (giving details of
small and big loan transactions and the relationship of lenders to professionals
and businessmen).
123. Fred Cook, If You Are Willing to Put Up Your Body for Collateral, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 28, 1968, at SM19.
124. Selwyn Raab, Loan-Sharking Inquiry Gives Officials New Insights into
Organized Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1984, at B2.
125. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 108, 120–21 (comparing loan sharks
lending money to businessmen to personal finance companies selling second
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the income scale in search of a more lucrative and less
troublesome clientele.
One New York loan shark explained why he no longer
worked the waterfront districts that had once teemed with mob
payday lenders: “I wouldn’t put out any money even at 15 per
cent [a week] now because operating costs are so high. Half the
guys who borrow are on dope and no matter what you do, they
aren’t going to pay you back because they end up on Rikers Island
[in jail] or getting shot by the cops.”126 Even a juice man couldn’t
squeeze blood from a turnip. His money was now invested with a
brokerage firm, he said, “because even if it ain’t sure, you don’t
have all those creeps and bums to work with.”127
Baker and Breitenstein claim that “the American [or mob]
loan shark problem remained severe until the late 1970s,” when
interest rates began to be deregulated.128 The landmark Supreme
Court decision was Marquette National Bank v. First Omaha
Service Corp., which authorized national banks to export
whatever interest rate was operative in the state where they
were chartered.129 “Because this final deregulation of interest
rates,” Baker and Breitenstein say, “included nearly every
potential borrower in the market for legal lending, the American
loan shark, whose collection practices were unappealing to
borrowers, was run out of business.”130 This fits the script of the
loan-shark thesis but it does not accord with the facts on the
ground. Mob payday lending had withered well before interest
rates were deregulated by the federal and state governments at
the end of the 1970s.131 The juice men were not run out of
business by new, high-priced forms of credit like the postdated
mortgages).
126. See FRANCIS IANNI, A FAMILY BUSINESS: KINSHIP AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN
ORGANIZED CRIME 99 (1972).
127. Id.
128. Baker & Breitenstein, supra note 2, at 587.
129. See Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
318 (1978) (allowing exportation of interest rates from one state to another, no
matter the laws of the state to which the rates are being imported).
130. See Baker & Breitenstein, supra note 2, at 587.
131. See Syndicate Loan-Shark Activities, supra note 121, at 168 (stating in
1966 that “syndicate loan-shark transactions no longer involve small sums of
money borrowed by impoverished wage earners”).
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check loans that were beginning to emerge in the 1980s. They
had already quit the field of their own accord. The mob loansharking that endured into the era of deregulation targeted
different populations and did not compete directly with the new
payday loans. It has been decades since anyone has had to worry
about underworld affiliates working the local factories and
trapping blue-collar family men with expensive $100 debts.
Even before its demise, it is doubtful that the problem of mob
payday lending could have been classified as “severe.” Certainly it
never reached anything like the scale of nonviolent loan-sharking
that flourished early in the twentieth century. In the urban
centers for which FBI case files were made available, the
estimate is that criminal loan sharks provided 0.1% of all
consumer credit in the city, or 43¢ per person.132 Because working
people in need of emergency cash constituted but one fraction of
the underworld lender’s clientele, it seems more accurate to
describe the problem of mob payday lending as minor, even
insignificant, but not severe.
Mob payday lending does belong to the era of the USLL, but
it is too great a simplification of the historical record to say that it
was caused in any direct way by that piece of legislation. The
story is more complicated. It is also inaccurate to say that
deregulation killed off the violent loan sharks, because that
population dwindled before interest rates were deregulated. What
is more, as I shall demonstrate below, black-market lending—
even of the violent sort—has endured where interest-rate caps
have been lifted. At the same time, deregulation has permitted
the older type of nonviolent loan sharks to reemerge in a new
form—as today’s payday lenders.
VI. The Return of the Loan Sharks
Baker and Breitenstein fear that if interest rates are capped
once again, the loan sharks will return. But what they do not see
is that the loan sharks in the original sense of the epithet have
already reappeared in large numbers, precisely because interest
rates were uncapped. Financial deregulation in the 1980s revived
132.

ANDERSON, supra note 101.
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the business of high-priced, short-term lending that the USLL
had largely quashed. Today’s payday lenders are the newest
breed of loan shark.
A. The Evolution of Payday Lending
The main difference between the salary loan of a hundred
years ago and today’s payday advance is the instrument of
security that binds the debtor to the creditor. Salary loans were
typically secured with a wage assignment, which entitled the
creditor to collect the payment due from the payroll office where
the debtor worked.133 While payday lenders now sometimes take
wage assignments too, their main instrument of security is the
postdated check debtors leave when they collect their cash. That
check is held in pawn and then redeemed on the borrower’s next
payday, unless the debt is renewed.134 Postdated-check lending
dates back to the 1930s but only became a big business during
the era of financial deregulation.135 It is an offshoot of the checkcashing industry and could only develop on a large scale when
checking accounts had proliferated into the bottom half of the
income scale.136 In some jurisdictions interest rates were
deregulated before the new product appeared on the scene, but in
others the established check cashers began to vend the product
first and only later sought legislative exemption from the existing
usury statutes, when the courts determined that the transaction
counted as an extension of credit.137 Eventually, forty-one states
accorded legal recognition to these new, high-priced loans, but a
cluster of states along the eastern seaboard retained their
traditional usury caps and thus blocked the development of a
133. See Guy Blake, The Validity of Laws Regulating Wage Assignments, 5
ILL. L. REV. 343, 343 (1911) (describing how salary loan debts were collected).
134. See Michael Stegman, Payday Lending, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 169, 169
(2007) (describing the process by which a person gets a payday loan).
135. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 128–37 (explaining why postdated-check
lending grew in the 1980s and 1990s).
136. See CASKEY, supra note 38, at 30–35 (recounting the development of the
check-cashing business).
137. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 160 (“[L]egislators in many states decided
the demand for this technically illegal product was such that it warranted
statutory authorization.”).
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legal market in payday loans. Over the past decade a backlash
has grown against the product, and some states have rescinded
the authorization they once granted to this industry. Today,
payday lending is feasible and permitted in thirty-four states.138
Interest-rate deregulation was one of the preconditions for
the rise of payday lending, but just as important was the
deregulation of banking that began at the end of the 1970s.139
New subprime credit products were developed, more credit was
extended further down the income scale, and banks began to
impose heavier penalties for bouncing checks and overdrawing
accounts. The new fees—combined with greater indebtedness,
decreased savings, and accelerating income inequality—stoked
the demand for the short bursts of liquidity that check lenders
began offering to subprime consumers at a premium price.
Payday lending grew in part as a way to avoid incurring the
expensive charges banks imposed when checking accounts ran
dry before they could be replenished from the income stream of
cash-strapped consumers.
In the space of twenty-five years, payday lending grew from
nothing into a $50 billion business.140 The fees the check lenders
charge today in the most deregulated jurisdictions are double the
rate of the old salary lenders and often more than the mob
payday lenders assessed. In states like Wisconsin, which does not
cap fees, the typical two-week, $300 loan costs $66.141 Stated as
an annual percentage rate, the cost is 573%.
B. The Debt Trap
Many people would classify a loan that expensive as loansharking. But, as I argued in a previous section of this paper, the
138. See Know Your Fee, COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA, http://cfsaa.com/our-resources/customer-resources/know-your-fee.aspx
(last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
139. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 119–28 (explaining the “infrastructure of
liquidity” in the late 1970s and 1980s).
140. See Bob Driehaus, Some States Set Caps to Control Payday Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at A17 (citing an estimate of Stephens, Inc., a consulting
firm that monitors the industry).
141. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 234 (recalling a time the author borrowed
on a payday loan).
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real measure of loan-sharking isn’t the annual percentage rate
lenders charge, but the length of time expensive debt endures.142
Loan-sharking is debt trapping; it is a predatory practice that
consists in renewing short-term loans again and again in order to
maximize fee income. This is what the salary lenders and the
juice men both did. They structured their extensions of credit in
such a way that ostensibly short-term loans became expensive
long-term debts.
If we make debt duration the measure of loan-sharking,
rather than the application of violence to collect the debt, then
today’s payday lending is loan-sharking. Only a small minority of
payday loan customers borrow for two weeks and then quit or
take out just a few loans dispersed over the course of a calendar
year.143 A recent report by the Center for Responsible Lending
offers telling evidence. Based on regulatory data gathered in
Oklahoma, the study reveals that payday borrowers “are indebted
an average of 212 days in the first year they borrow (or 58
percent of the year), and continue to be indebted over half the
time in their second year as well.”144 This average includes the
15% of customers who borrow once and never go back to the
payday lender. The report notes that, “if we leave out these onetime borrowers, we estimate that the remaining 85 percent of
borrowers are indebted for [an average of] 345 days (63 percent of
the total time period) in their first 18 months and 432 days (59
percent of the total time period) on average over the course of two
years.”145 What is more, the data “demonstrate that borrowers
tend to become more heavily indebted—taking out loans more
frequently and for larger amounts—as they continue to borrow
from payday lenders.”146 These are exactly the sorts of patterns
that earned the salary lenders the loan shark epithet a hundred
years ago.
142.
143.

See supra Part II.C.
See URIAH KING, LESLIE PARRISH & OZLEM TANIK, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, FINANCIAL QUICKSAND: PAYDAY LENDING SINKS BORROWERS IN DEBT
WITH $4.2 BILLION IN PREDATORY FEES EVERY YEAR 6–9 (2006) (reporting that
“most borrowers renew payday loans many times per year”).
144. URIAH KING & LESLIE PARRISH, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PAYDAY
LOANS, INC.: SHORT ON CREDIT, LONG ON DEBT 5 (2011).
145. Id.
146. See id. at 6.
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The results of this study are entirely representative. The
payday lenders’ national organization cautions consumers that
“payday advances should be used for short-term financial needs
only, not as a long-term financial solution.”147 But in every
jurisdiction where regulatory data are reported on the pattern of
consumer use, trends like those revealed in Oklahoma recur.148
These short-term loans become, in the majority of cases, longterm and very expensive debts. The product forms a trap, clever
because it does not ensnare every consumer and because the
result is achieved without the use of fraud or violence. If we judge
matters by the public outcry, payday lending is the shrewdest
form of loan-sharking yet devised.
C. The Scale of Payday Lending
Measured by the fraction of the population that makes use of
the product, payday lending has not reached the scale of salary
lending a hundred years ago and it is unlikely ever to do so. The
consumer credit market has expanded enormously over the past
century and it is now thickly populated with many different kinds
of products. Many wage earners who might have patronized the
salary lenders at the start of the twentieth century can now
charge purchases on a bank card and pay the bill later or get a
cash advance with a credit card. Both options will be much
cheaper than a payday loan, unless late penalties are incurred.149
147. According to the Consumer Financial Services Association (CFSA) best
practices, all member stores display a sign with this warning or one similar to it.
See CFSA Best Practies, http://cfsaa.com/cfsa-member-best-practices.aspx (follow
“Encourage Consumer Responsibility”) (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). Many members also post such a warning
on their website. See, e.g., Express Check Advance, http://www.express
checkadvance.com/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (displaying the quoted warning
near the bottom of the member company web sites) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Check Into Cash, http://www.checkintocash.biz/ (last
visited Apr. 3, 2012) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. See URIAH KING & LESLIE PARRISH, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
SPRINGING THE DEBT TRAP: RATE CAPS ARE ONLY PROVEN PAYDAY LENDING
REFORM 8–12 (2007) (finding that long-term recurring debt is common with
payday loans).
149. See Kelly D. Edmiston, Could Restrictions on Payday Lending Hurt
Consumers?, FED. RES. BANK OF KANSAS CITY ECON. REV. 63, 65 (2011) (“[T]he fee
on a typical payday loan is more than 25 times greater than the interest on a
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Estimates of the percentage of the population that has secured a
payday advance are imprecise. According to the 2007 Survey of
Consumer Finances, 2.4% of households reported getting a
payday advance during the preceding twelve months.150 But selfreporting surveys probably underestimate significantly the size of
the market because a taint attaches itself to the product. The
latest regulatory report on payday lending in Florida stated that
about 750,000 individuals had secured at least one payday loan
during the previous twelve months, which works out to be 5% of
the adult population in the state and as many as one in ten
households.151 Two million adults (or one in seven) have secured a
payday advance in Florida over the past decade, according to
state records,152 but only an estimated 303,000 residents
admitted doing so in a comprehensive survey carried out by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 2009.153 But whether
the higher or lower estimates are more accurate, it seems clear
that loan-sharking of the nonviolent sort does not engulf as large
a share of the population today as it did in the heyday of salary
lending.
There is proportionately less salary debt trapping now than
there once was in the earliest phases of the credit society, but in
contrast to the past, the great bulk of this debt trapping is legal.
The market now is white, not gray or black. Loan-sharking in its
original sense has been licensed, in part due to the misguided
fear that prohibition of high-rate lending will revive the mob loan
sharks that continue to haunt the modern imagination. In the
next Part of the Article, I explain why this fear is misplaced and
what forms black-market lending now takes in the twenty-first
century.

typical credit card.”).
150. Brian Bucks, Arthur Kennickell, Traci Mach & Kevin Moore, Changes
in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007: Evidence from the Survey of
Consumer Finances, 95 FED. RES. BULL. A1, A47 (2009).
151. See VERITEC SOLUTIONS, FLORIDA TRENDS IN DEFERRED PRESENTMENT 6,
11 (2010).
152. See id. at 8.
153. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ADDENDUM TO THE 2009
FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS: USE OF
ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SERVICES 50 (2010).

LOAN SHARKS

841
VII. Illegal Lending Today

According to Baker and Breitenstein, “[i]t is very likely that
elimination of the other alternative sources of credit which are
the main competition for the American loan shark would result in
his return.”154 If the interest rates lenders may charge are capped
so low that payday lending and other forms of expensive
subprime credit disappear, violent loan-sharking will be revived,
they claim. But there is no need to speculate about whether low
usury caps would have this effect. Payday lending is infeasible or
prohibited today in sixteen states plus the District of Columbia.155
If the loan-shark thesis is valid, extortionate payday lending
ought to flourish where prohibition is enforced and should not
exist where interest rates have been deregulated. But the
evidence suggests that neither of these propositions is correct.
A. Where Prohibition Is in Effect
With a maximum permissible interest rate of 18% a year,
Vermont has one of the lowest usury caps in the nation.156 Payday
lending has never been authorized there, yet no federal
indictments have been recorded in the state during the last
twenty years for engaging in an extortionate credit transaction,
and the local press has not published a single story in that time
about local black-market lending.157 If the loan-shark thesis were
valid, violent loan-sharking ought to be rampant in Vermont, but
there is no evidence that it is. The usury cap in Maine is 30% a
year,158 but no federal prosecutions for extortionate lending have
been initiated during the twenty-first century. One such case was
processed during the 1990s, but it concerned a botched drug deal,

154. See Baker & Breitenstein, supra note 2, at 596.
155. COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note
138.
156. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 41a (West 2011) (detailing the specific
provisions of Vermont’s maximum loan laws).
157. U.S. District Court, District of Vermont, Official Court Electronic
Document Filing System, case search for U.S. Code Section 18:894, Collection of
Credit by Extortion, performed 1 September 2011.
158. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 2-401 (2011).
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not a loan-sharking operation.159 The local press has also failed to
register any reports about criminal gangs engaged in illegal
lending over the past two decades. Maryland is another state that
retained its version of the USLL but shows no evidence that loanshark rings have ever flourished there during the last quartercentury.160
Other states that prohibit expensive check loans have
recorded more federal indictments for extortionate lending, in
those jurisdictions where organized crime has long operated.
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, four cases were
initiated under Part 18:894 of the United States Code in
Connecticut; seven in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania;
seventeen in Massachusetts; seventeen in New Jersey; and
seventy-one in the Southern District of New York.161 But where
accounts of individual cases are available, it seems clear that
none of the mob loan-sharking prosecuted by federal authorities
could be classified as payday lending. The loans were too large
and the interest rates too low to make these transactions
comparable to the payday advance. The typical victims of these
criminal loan sharks were gamblers and small businessmen, not
single moms in search of emergency cash.
Very rarely, reports surface in some of these states of vestpocket credit operations that more closely approximate payday
lending. New York State’s Office of the Inspector General
reported a case in 2009 of a state employee who had been making
small loans for some years at usurious rates to coworkers.162 A
$30 cash advance cost $40 two weeks later, which translates into
159. U.S. District Court, District of Maine, Official Court Electronic
Document Filing System, case search for U.S. Code Section 18:894, Collection of
Credit by Extortion, performed 1 September 2011.
160. U.S. District Court, District of Maryland, Official Court Electronic
Document Filing System, case search for U.S. Code Section 18:894, Collection of
Credit by Extortion, performed 1 September 2011.
161. Case searches were performed on 1 September 2011 for U.S. Code
Section 18:894, Collection of Credit by Extortion, for these U.S. District Court
jurisdictions: District of Connecticut, District of Massachusetts, District of New
Jersey, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and Southern District of New York.
162. See Final Report, State of New York, Office of the State Inspector
General (Jan. 22, 2009) (detailing an investigation of an employee in the State
Higher Education Services Corporation) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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an annual percentage rate of 865%.163 Other loans cost less or
were for considerably larger sums, and, like many independent
operators, this black-market lender never threatened debtors
with physical harm.164 Over the space of a decade he extended
approximately $13,000 in credit.165 The man was an old-fashioned
loan shark, but it is striking how rare his breed is in a state that
caps interest rates so low. The Inspector General’s Office has
issued scores and scores of press releases over the past five years
detailing allegations of employee impropriety, but in that time
period only one case of vest-pocket loan-sharking has come to
light.166 No doubt some illegal lending is never detected, but if
violent payday lending were rife, as the loan-shark thesis predicts
it will be in states with low usury caps, more evidence of its
occurrence ought to surface because loan-sharking—especially
violent loan-sharking—makes for good headlines.
B. Where Deregulation Is in Effect
The loan-shark thesis is wrong in both its predictions: states
with low rate caps have experienced little or no violent loansharking in recent years, while at least some states with high or
no rate caps have failed to exterminate this form of predation.
Illinois is one example. It deregulated interest rates in 1982, but
federal prosecution of extortionate credit transactions still occurs.
In the 1990s, nineteen cases were prosecuted and since 2000,
when efforts to regulate payday lending began, another six cases
were initiated.167 As is true elsewhere, none of these cases
involved what could be called payday lending, which the juice
crews gave up long ago. In slum areas in Chicago, reports have
surfaced of neighborhood loan sharks who extend credit to
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Reports of Investigations and Press Releases, NEW YORK STATE
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, http://www.ig.ny.gov/reports/reports.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2011) (displaying links to archived reports of investigation
2006–2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
167. U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Official Court
Electronic Document Filing System, case search for U.S. Code Section 18:894,
Collection of Credit by Extortion, performed 1 September 2011.
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“shopkeepers and residents who may not have bank accounts or
access to lines of credit.”168 One sociologist counted seventeen
loan sharks in the community where he did fieldwork back in the
1990s, some employing violence to collect debts but others not.169
Compared to a payday loan, the rates being charged seemed like
a bargain: 20%–30% spread over several weeks or months. This
black-market business persisted even though licensed lenders
could charge any rate they liked in the legal market. Rate caps
cannot explain the phenomenon because they had been removed.
The case of Great Britain also exposes the fallacy of the loanshark thesis. Violent loan-sharking existed there in rough
neighborhoods before it made its appearance in the United States
and it occurred both before interest rates were restricted in 1927
and after.170 Interest rates were deregulated once again in 1974,
but the problem of violent loan-sharking has become more
prominent since that time.171 It occurs mostly in depressed areas
among the unemployed, who rely on public assistance. The illegal
lender takes the debtor’s benefit book as collateral for the cash
advance but may also use violence to compel repayment.172 A
survey of low-income households in Great Britain reported that
3% had turned to illegal lenders for credit, which works out to be
0.44% of the total British population.173 The problem could not be
described as severe, although the press regularly reports
harrowing anecdotes, but the key point is that violent loansharking occurs in Great Britain even though interest rates are
not capped. Deregulation does not automatically exterminate this
168. SUDHIR
THE URBAN POOR

VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF
140 (2006).
169. See id. at 399–400 (describing seventeen “creditors” in the underground
economy of Marquis Park).
170. See SEAN O’CONNELL, CREDIT AND COMMUNITY: WORKING-CLASS DEBT IN
THE UK SINCE 1880 131–37, 162–63 (2009) (recalling examples of threats and
violence from loan sharks in Great Britain).
171. See AVRAM TAYLOR, WORKING CLASS CREDIT AND COMMUNITY SINCE 1918
58–65 (2002) (describing how since 1974 it has been illegal for anyone to lend
any amount of money for interest if they do not have a license, and as a result,
loan sharks have turned to violence to collect debts).
172. See id. at 60 (describing using the benefit book as collateral as
“important” because once introduced into the relationship, “the individuals no
longer needed to have any trust in each other”).
173. PERSONAL FINANCE RESEARCH CENTRE, ILLEGAL LENDING IN THE UK 38,
77 (2006).
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breed because not even a payday lender unencumbered by rate
caps will extend credit to everyone who walks through the door.
Some types of debtors are too risky to lend to unless you can
extort repayment from them, which means that even the freest
market will not be able to kill off every loan shark.
C. In Cyberspace
The loan-shark thesis is too simple, I have shown, but it is
also outdated. It does not take account of the way that
technological change has remade the market for illegal loans.
Today, somebody who is short of cash before payday and who
cannot access legal credit will not go searching for a break-yourleg loan shark in her neighborhood but will turn instead to the
Internet, where unlicensed lending abounds.174 Cash can be
deposited directly in a checking account and payments debited
automatically, without debtor and creditor ever having to meet
face to face. The charges are very high, typically $25–$30 dollars
for every $100 borrowed, and, “in many cases, the default option
is to pay the finance charge only and renew the loan for another
payday. If a consumer does nothing, the loan is automatically
flipped.”175 This is the purest sort of loan-sharking, understood as
debt trapping, but no customer is ever beaten by an online
payday lender. The unlicensed vendors often locate themselves in
tribal jurisdictions that claim sovereign immunity from local
regulations or offshore, beyond the reach of American laws.176
They have developed aggressive methods of debt collection,
sometimes falsely threatening debtors with arrest for bank
fraud,177 but they cannot be classified as violent loan sharks even
174. See generally JEAN ANN FOX & ANNA PETRINI, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF
AMERICA, INTERNET PAYDAY LENDING (2004) (outlining the advent of Internet
payday lending and recommending increased regulation).
175. Id. at 4, 17.
176. See id. at 7–8 (citing examples of American companies that operate
online out of Canada and the Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis).
177. See Intelligence Note, Telephone Collection Scam Related to Delinquent
Payday Loans, INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CENTER (Dec. 1, 2010),
http://www.ic3.gov/media/2010/101201.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (“[C]allers
threaten victims with legal action, arrests, and in some cases physical violence if
they refuse to pay.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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when their techniques are extortionate. They are a new mutation
of the loan shark genus and constitute a bigger problem than the
violent loan sharks that ceded the payday loan market long ago.
There are no reliable figures on the volume of illegal Internet
payday lending that is occurring today.178 Some states that
impose lower rate caps and prohibit payday lending have
aggressively pursued the unlicensed vendors,179 but this does not
mean more of that type of loan-sharking is occurring in these
states. Unlicensed lenders can trap consumers anywhere in
cyberspace, regardless of whether payday lending is permitted in
the borrower’s locale. Statistics reported by the Internet Crime
Complaint Center for each state do not show any correlation with
local usury laws.180 A news article on payday lending in Oregon
reported that complaints against payday lenders increased after
the usury rate was lowered to 36% a year, but the numbers cited
were small.181 It stands to reason that Internet payday lending
would be more frequent where the product is not available from
bricks-and-mortar vendors, but only these cyber loan sharks
know the actual numbers. Whatever the numbers may be, what
must be appreciated is that unlicensed virtual payday lending is
the new face of loan-sharking now. It is not violent and its appeal
as a way to raise cash quickly and anonymously reduces still
further the likelihood that violent loan-sharking will be revived
where rate caps are imposed or reduced. The shape of blackmarket credit has changed. Mob payday lending ought to be seen
as a historical anomaly rather than an ever-present threat. There
is no reason to think it will swell where price caps are imposed
today.

178. See DENNIS TELZROW, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE PAYDAY ADVANCE
INDUSTRY (2008) (estimating that the legal market for Internet payday lending
is $7 billion).
179. See Stephen Franklin, Trapped by Web Loans with the 842% Interest
Rate, CHI. TRIB., May 11, 2008, at 1 (reporting on Illinois officials who heavily
fined a short-term lender who had charged a consumer 2,190% annual interest
on a loan).
180. INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CENTER, 2010 INTERNET CRIME REPORT 22
(2010), available at http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2010_IC3Report.pdf.
181. See Matthew Kish, Payday Mayday: After Reform, Borrowers Flock to
Shady Internet Payday Lenders, PORTLAND BUS. J., Feb. 11, 2011, at 1 (citing
sixty-three Oregonians complaining in 2010, up from twenty-one in 2005).
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VIII. Conclusion: The Minimization of Loan-sharking
If we define loan-sharking as it was originally understood, as
expensive debt trapping, and if we recognize that some loan
sharks are violent but others are not, then the American
experience with payday lending over the past 150 years teaches
us that the total quantity of loan-sharking has been reduced the
most when interest-rate ceilings are pegged at a moderate level.
The USLL, which capped the price of small loans in the vicinity of
36% a year, was the most effective anti-loan-sharking measure
ever adopted in this country. It raised the ceiling high enough for
authorized lenders to market responsible credit products but not
so high that it licensed the short-term, interest-only extensions of
credit that have been the preferred method of debt trapping by
every species of loan shark. Even if it is true that the USLL
spawned a certain number of violent mob lenders in the biggest
cities—a result, as we have seen, that did not occur automatically
or everywhere—it must also be acknowledged that this law and
the industry it regulated starved into extinction many more of the
nonviolent but no less predatory salary lenders and salary buyers
who were the pests of payday early in the twentieth century.
Financial deregulation, by contrast, came on the scene after mob
payday lending had vanished, and what it managed to accomplish
was to call back into existence a loan-sharking industry that
progressive reformers thought they had vanquished.
Defenders of today’s payday lending industry correctly
observe that other credit products exist now that are even more
expensive than the postdated-check loan. When calculated as an
annual percentage rate, the overdraft charges levied by banks
can exceed 1000%.182 Such products could be construed as debt
trapping too and more onerous than payday loans.183 Where
payday advances are permitted, consumers have a lower cost and
convenient alternative that can help them avoid the debt traps
182. See Owen Asplundh, Bounce Protection: Payday Lending in Sheep’s
Clothing, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 349, 349–51 (2004) (noting that “[l]ike payday
lending,” which can cost 300% to 1,000% expressed as an APR, “the calculated
APR for bounce protection is potentially astronomical”).
183. See Marc Fusaro, Hidden Consumer Loans: An Analysis of Implicit
Interest Rates on Bounced Checks, 29 J. FAM. ECON. ISSUES 251, 251 (2008)
(comparing payday loans to new bounce protection loans offered by banks).
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laid by banks.184 Viewed from this angle, payday lending looks
like a market-based solution to the most expensive forms of
predatory lending. We fight loan sharks, too, the payday lenders
might say, but we get no credit because the loan sharks we
fight—the chartered banks—hide behind a cloak of respectability.
Whether payday lending increases or decreases the demand
for overdraft products is a disputed issue that I will not try to
resolve here.185 But the point with which I will conclude is that
this is the right way to frame the question about loan-sharking.
The problem of loan-sharking is fundamentally the problem of
debt trapping. It comes in different forms and the aim of public
policy ought to be to minimize the total quantity of trapping that
occurs. The goal should be to reduce the whole population of loan
sharks and not just one breed. The violent sort of loan shark
emphasized by what I have called the loan-shark thesis is the
most exotic and dangerous species in this genus, but it is also the
rarest. Whatever threat it may have represented decades ago, it
has dwindled away and is unlikely to be revived in the altered
environment of the twenty-first century. What we ought to be
worried about is not the mob shark but all of the other debt
trappers that have proliferated since our credit markets were
deregulated. There are more of them now than ever before and
most of them have been issued licenses. That is the loan-shark
problem regulators should confront.

184. See Zywicki, supra note 1, at 426, 453 (listing APRs as high as 520% for
just one check in overdraft protection plans).
185. Compare Dennis Campbell, Asis Jerez & Peter Tufano, Bouncing out of
the Banking System: An Empirical Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account
Closures (Dec. 3, 2008) (concluding that when compared with overdraft activity,
“access to payday lending seems to lead to higher rates of account closure”)
(unpublished working paper) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review), with DONALD P. MORGAN & MICHAEL R. STRAIN, PAYDAY HOLIDAY: HOW
HOUSEHOLDS FARED AFTER PAYDAY CREDIT BANS (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.
Staff Rep. No. 309) (2008) (reporting that the volume of bounced checks
increased in Georgia after the state banned payday lending).

